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Religious organizations aim to accomplish the unique goals and missions 
tied to their faiths.1  Accomplishing these goals requires the work of 
organizational leaders and members.  In many cases, a religious 
organization hires and pays individuals to work for the organization.2  Both 
federal and state labor and employer laws often apply to those hiring 
relationships.  As nonprofit organizations, religious organizations also rely 
on volunteers to provide services to the organizations.3  The employment 
                                                          
 + Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.B.A., summa cum laude, 
University of Oklahoma, 1997; J.D., with highest honors, University of Oklahoma College of 
Law, 2000.  Thanks to Elizabeth Caulfield for her helpful research assistance on this article 
and the participants at the July 30, 2015 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference 
panel discussion on whistleblower topics for providing comments and feedback related to the 
ideas that form the substance of this article. 
 1. See Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining the 
Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 233‒34 (2012). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys., 317 P.3d 1009, 1024 (Wash. 2014) 
(Stephens, J., dissenting) (explaining that many non-profits have to compete with for-profits 
for employees, which forces non-profits to rely on volunteers for much of their work).  
Religious organizations “receive the lion’s share of private contributions and more volunteer 
labor than any other nonprofit segment.”  Id. at 1025 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Evelyn 
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and volunteer selections made by a religious organization play a 
fundamental role in whether the organization will achieve its goals and 
further its mission.  Protecting the internal operations of religious 
organizations, such as employee selection, from inappropriate 
governmental intrusion is an important societal value.4  This societal value 
reaches its zenith with respect to a religious organization’s selection of its 
ministers, clergy, or spiritual leaders.5  A religious organization has broad 
First Amendment protection under the Free Exercise Clause to select its 
ministerial leaders without governmental intrusion and interference, so that 
the group may chart its own course and develop its faith.6 
Federal and state governments are secular institutions.7  These institutions 
have an important societal role in regulating employment relationships in 
the for-profit and non-profit sectors with respect to a variety of matters.  
These matters include, but are not limited to, employment security, freedom 
from discrimination, wage and hour protections, workplace safety and 
health, employee protections for reporting civil or criminal violations, and 
contract enforcement.8  As compared to the founding era of the United 
States, the modern state pervasively regulates employment relationships, 
and the degree of regulation continues to increase.9  One area in which 
                                                          
Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-
Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 470 n.50 (1996)). 
 4. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709‒10 
(1976); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 
(1871). 
 5. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
706 (2012); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 
F.2d 1164, 1167‒68 (4th Cir. 1985); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indust. Review 
Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 880 (Wis. 2009). 
 6. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  
U.S. CONST. amend I.  In Hosanna-Tabor, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a ministerial 
exception derived from the First Amendment and barred a minister’s employment 
discrimination suit against the church because such suits interfere with “the internal 
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will 
personify its beliefs.”  132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8. See generally, e.g., Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901‒915 (West 2015); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.  
§§ 621‒634 (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201‒219 (2012); Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651‒678 (2012); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
 9. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (noting the absence of government employment 
regulation at the time of adoption of the First Amendment).  See also Sid L. Moller, Birth of 
Contract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace, 50 S.C. L. REV. 183, 194 (1998) (noting 
that “the non-union employment relationship is now . . . heavily regulated”); Michael R. 
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increasing regulation exists is whistleblower laws.10  Federal and state 
legislatures and the judiciary have recognized the value of providing 
employment protection for employees who report civil and criminal 
violations to their own organizations or to outside sources, such as law 
enforcement agencies.11  Protecting employee whistleblowers encourages 
reporting and serves the interest of the employee, the public, and third 
parties who may be harmed by the alleged wrongdoing.12 
Clashes inevitably arise when employment laws of general applicability, 
like whistleblower laws, are applied to religious organizations because their 
application may substantially interfere with a religious organization’s 
employee selection decisions and could negatively impact an organization’s 
faith-based goals and mission.13  Religious organizations advocate for First 
Amendment and statutory protections for their employee selection 
procedures in the form of accommodations, exemptions, and exceptions 
from employment laws of general applicability.14  Via the U.S. Constitution 
                                                          
Blum, The Trend for Increased Regulation of Employers Under the Current Administration, 
in COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS (Aspatore 2010), 2010 WL 3253662, at 
*1 (noting a “significant increase in labor and employment regulation of employers since 
January 2009”). 
 10. RICHARD CARLSON & SCOTT A. MOSS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 751‒52 (3d ed. 2013).  
 11. Id. at 751‒52 (explaining how the public’s interest in protecting employee 
whistleblowers has “grown over time” with federal statutes that provide anti-retaliation 
protection for employment and certain non-employment laws, as well as court decisions 
recognizing specific “public policy-based exceptions to the employment at will doctrine”). 
 12. Id. at 750‒51. 
 13. Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1610‒13 (2004) (expounding upon the conflict between government 
regulation of employment in religious organizations and church autonomy). 
 14. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(11) (2010) (explicitly excluding religious 
non-profit organizations from its definition of “employer” and therefore exempting such 
organizations from certain workplace discrimination regulations).  In Ockletree v. Franciscan 
Health System, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington Law Against 
Discrimination statutory provision violated neither the privileges and immunities clause nor 
the establishment clause of the Washington Constitution. 317 P.3d 1009, 1016‒17, 1019‒20 
(Wash. 2014).  See also Lauren Markoe, Supreme Court To Examine ‘Ministerial Exception’ 
Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/09/29/supreme-court-ministerial-exemption_n_987348.html (noting that according to 
Ira C. Lupu, a professor at The George Washington University School of Law, “[a]dvocates 
for the ministerial exemption argue that religious institutions, in their hiring and firing, should 
be regulated as little as possible” while those opposing this viewpoint “are . . . concerned that 
a particular group is cast outside the various protections of civil rights law.”); Molly A. 
Gerratt, Note, Closing a Loophole: Headley v. Church of Scientology International as an 
Argument for Placing Limits on the Ministerial Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 141, 160 (2011) (“Church autonomy advocates argue that the scope of the ministerial 
exception is expanded when it is backed by a strong right to church autonomy.”). 
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and statutes, courts have recognized some protection for religious 
organizations’ employee selection procedures.15 
This Article attempts to understand the broader issue of employment law 
exemptions of general applicability for religious organizations by 
evaluating specific employment suits brought by ministers.  The societal 
value of shielding religious organizations from governmental interference 
in employee selection procedures is at its height with respect to a 
congregation’s decisions regarding its selection of ministers.16  However, 
society also has an interest in encouraging citizen-employees to report civil 
and criminal violations, protecting employees from discrimination, and 
enforcing contracts.17  Do these employment laws protect ministers?  The 
question is only partially answered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission,18 which recognizes that there is a 
ministerial exception protected by the First Amendment in the context of 
employment discrimination suits.19  This Article will use the Hosanna-
Tabor decision as a starting point for evaluating the employment rights of 
ministers against the backdrop of church autonomy in ministerial selection. 
Part I of the Article explains the ministerial exception and ecclesiastical 
abstention concepts and describes the policies underlying the Hosanna-
Tabor decision.  Part II of the Article examines relevant cases that have 
arisen both before and after the Hosanna-Tabor decision in order to 
understand how suits brought by ministers asserting employment law rights 
are being decided.  Part III of the Article details a categorical approach to 
resolving minister suits.20  Based on the discussion below, there should be 
a strong presumption that minister whistleblower suits are generally barred 
on First Amendment grounds. 
I.  MINISTERIAL SELECTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A religious organization’s right to select its clergy, ministers, and 
spiritual leaders free from governmental interference is one of the most 
important rights protected by the First Amendment.  Courts utilize three 
                                                          
 15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act exempts 
religious organizations from its prohibition against religious discrimination with respect to 
employment of individuals.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (stating that  “[Title VII] shall not 
apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect 
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the 
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its 
activities”). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
 17. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 18. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 19. Id. at 705–06, 709–10. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
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concepts when determining whether a minister suit alleging employment 
law violations is permitted: the ministerial exception; the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine; and the “neutral principles of law” approach.21 
The ministerial exception is a judicially created principle that bars federal 
and state statutory employment discrimination suits by ministers against the 
religious organizations that employ them.22  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals first created the exception in 1972.23  The federal appellate circuit 
courts recognized and developed the exception for forty years.24  In 2012, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the exception and concluded that it is 
an “affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim” and “not a 
jurisdictional bar.”25  While the exception is labeled as ministerial for 
naming purposes, it is not limited to ordained clergy.26  It applies to any 
employee of a religious organization who conveys the group’s spiritual 
                                                          
 21. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) 
(discussing ecclesiastical abstention).  See also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) 
(discussing “neutral principles of law”); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694 (discussing the 
ministerial exception). 
 22. SUSAN GROVER, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND 
PRACTICE CASEBOOK 323 (2d ed. 2014).  See also Chopko & Parker supra note 1, at 234. 
 23. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972).  The Fifth 
Circuit stated: 
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment 
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and 
its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious 
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause 
of the First Amendment. . . .  We therefore hold that Congress did not intend, 
through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to 
regulate the employment relationship between church and minister. 
Id. 
 24. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–09 (2d Cir. 2008); Schleicher v. The 
Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 
F.3d 223, 225–27 (6th Cir. 2007); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–07 (3d Cir. 
2006); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800–01 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345–50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. 
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Natal v. Christian & Missionary 
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 25. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (“We agree [with the federal court of appeals] 
that there is such a ministerial exception.”); id. at 709 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)) (holding “that the exception operates as an 
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar” because the 
issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief and not whether the court “has power to hear 
the case”). 
 26. See id. at 713–14. 
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message and carries out its spiritual mission.27  The exception clearly 
applies to pastors, priests, and rabbis, but may also be available to other 
workers, such as “lay employees, seminary professors, hospital workers, 
press secretaries, [and] musicians.”28 
The exception derives from the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses and is grounded on the principle of church 
autonomy.29  Religious organizations have a First Amendment right to 
organize themselves, define their missions, and choose their workers 
without undue governmental interference.30  The First Amendment 
precludes government interference in this endeavor.31  The rationale for the 
exception is that minister employment discrimination suits unduly interfere 
with a church’s leadership decisions.32  Ministerial employment decisions 
are made solely by the religious body, without the government’s influence, 
because it is through these decisions that a religious body shapes its faith 
and accomplishes its goals.33  The Hosanna-Tabor Court stated: 
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of 
their ministers.  Requiring a church to accept or retain an 
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, 
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.  Such 
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, 
depriving the church of control over the selection of those who 
will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the 
state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious 
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments.  According the state the power to determine which 
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement 
in such ecclesiastical decisions.34 
The exception does not exist merely to prevent minister employment 
discrimination suits that involve determining whether the religious 
                                                          
 27. See id. at 708, 713–14.  The Court held that the fact that an employee has been 
ordained or commissioned is relevant to whether the employee qualifies as a minister for 
purposes of the exception, but the lack of a commission or ordination is not dispositive.  Id. 
at 708.  In part, the Court based its ministerial status determination on a Lutheran 
schoolteacher because her job duties “reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and 
carrying out its mission.”  Id. 
 28. See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Ky. 2014) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 29. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
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organization based its employment decision on a religious reason.35  Cue 
the Hosanna-Tabor Court again in response to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) argument that the defendant-religious 
organization did not have a religious reason for terminating the Lutheran 
schoolteacher’s employment and therefore the ministerial exception did not 
apply: 
The EEOC and Perich [the Lutheran school teacher] suggest that 
Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich—that 
she violated the Synod’s commitment to internal dispute 
resolution—was pretextual.  The suggestion misses the point of 
the ministerial exception.  The purpose of the exception is not to 
safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is 
made for a religious reason.  The exception instead ensures that 
the authority to select and control who will minister to the 
faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone.36 
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is related to the ministerial 
exception, but is broader.37  This doctrine also derives from the First 
Amendment.38  It is not strictly focused on personnel decisions regarding 
ministers.39  Instead, the doctrine requires secular courts to avoid resolving 
disputes that relate to church doctrine.40  Federal and state courts have 
interpreted the First Amendment as requiring secular courts to avoid 
interference or entanglement with ecclesiastical disputes.41  A line of U.S. 
Supreme Court and state supreme court cases elucidate this principle.42  
Secular courts simply have no power, role, or competency under our 
constitutional system to weigh in on ecclesiastical disputes that concern 
church doctrine, faith, and practices.43  In essence, secular courts must avoid 
resolution of religious controversies, doctrine, and beliefs in order to 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 709. 
 36. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 37. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976); 
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender Equality vs. Religious Autonomy: Suing Religious 
Employers for Sexual Harassment After Hosanna-Tabor, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 89, 92 
(2015) (noting that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is “broader” than the ministerial 
exception). 
 38. See, e.g., Jennison v. Prasifka, 391 S.W.3d 660, 665 (Tex. App. 2013) (quoting 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine stands for the 
proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
matters concerning ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or 
the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’”). 
 39. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 40. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724–25.  See also supra note 37. 
 41. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724–25; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871); Marsh v. Johnson, 82 S.W.2d 345, 
346 (Ky. 1935); Nance v. Busby, 18 S.W. 874, 879 (Tenn. 1892). 
 42. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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prevent the “chilling effect” such resolution would have on church practices 
as a result of such governmental intrusion.44  Notably, a strand within the 
doctrine (which may be considered an exception to the doctrine or merely a 
corollary) indicates that secular courts have the power to hear a suit 
involving a church or minister if the suit can be resolved through “neutral 
principles of law” and without entanglement in church administration, 
beliefs, and doctrine.45  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is relevant to 
minister employment suits to the extent that such suits involve church 
doctrine, faith, and practices.46  Some courts have concluded that the 
“neutral principles” approach could resolve certain types of employment 
law claims brought by ministers—breach of contract claims, for example—
without running afoul of the First Amendment.47 
II.  HOSANNA-TABOR AND CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the EEOC sued a Lutheran church, alleging that it had 
unlawfully fired Cheryl Perich, a called Lutheran schoolteacher, in 
retaliation for threatening to file a lawsuit under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).48  The Supreme Court recognized a ministerial 
exception to the application of employment discrimination statutes 
grounded in both the First Amendment and the church autonomy principle 
with respect to internal church governance.49  The Court also developed a 
                                                          
 44. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 619 (Ky. 2014). 
 45. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–07 (1979).  The Court stated: 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely 
secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious 
organization and polity.  The method relies exclusively on objective, well-
established [legal] concepts. . . .  It thereby promises to free civil courts completely 
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. 
Id.  See also Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., United Methodist Church v. Cal. Super. Ct., 
San Diego, 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978); N.Y. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church v. Fisher, 438 A.2d 62, 68 (Conn. 1980); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856 
(N.J. 2002); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 46. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that a 
chaplain’s breach of employment contract claim against a private Catholic college survived a 
motion to dismiss because review of the claim “at the outset” would not “unconstitutionally 
entangle the court in religion”); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that a minister’s breach of oral 
contract claim against a church survived a motion to dismiss because neutral principles of law 
could decide the dispute without entanglement).  See also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (opining that churches are not 
“above the law” and “may be held liable for . . . their valid contracts”). 
 48. 132 S. Ct. 694, 699–701 (2012).  Perich also was a party to the suit and alleged an 
ADA retaliation claim and a disability retaliation claim under the Michigan Persons with 
Disabilities Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 701. 
 49. Id. at 706. 
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functional totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining whether an 
individual is covered by the ministerial exception.50 
Perich qualified as a minister under the test for three main reasons.51  
First, the church held her out as a minister by extending her a calling.52  
Second, the church provided her with a title as a commissioned minister 
because she had undergone formal religious training and a commissioning 
process.53  Third, Perich’s job duties included religious instruction, as well 
as leading students in prayer, devotional exercises, and chapel service.54 
The Hosanna-Tabor decision correctly recognized the ministerial 
exception and did well in explaining and emphasizing the fundamental 
policy reason for the exception: the church autonomy principle.55  The Court 
also made reasonably clear that the exception seemingly bars minister 
federal and state statutory employment discrimination claims and minister 
federal and state statutory anti-retaliation claims alleging retaliation by the 
employer for asserting rights under federal and state employment 
discrimination statutes, respectively.56  While the Court characterized the 
case as an “employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a 
minister,”57 the suit was more specifically an employment anti-retaliation 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 707–09.  The Court noted that “[i]n light of . . . the formal title given to Perich 
by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important 
religious functions she performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich was a minister 
covered by the ministerial exception.”  Id. at 708. 
 51. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 52. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 708. 
 55. Id. at 706, 709.  See also Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
493, 562 n.12 (2013) (“Hosanna-Tabor naturally sparked significant and thoughtful debate 
on the contours of the church autonomy doctrine.”). 
 56. The Hosanna-Tabor Court’s decision seemingly barred both the federal and state 
disability retaliation claims.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.3.  The Court noted that 
the plaintiff did not dispute that if the ministerial exception barred her federal ADA retaliation 
claim it also barred her Michigan state retaliation claim.  Id. (“Perich does not dispute that if 
the ministerial exception bars her retaliation claim under the ADA, it also bars her retaliation 
claim under Michigan law.”).  There appears to be at least tacit approval by the Court that the 
state law claim is barred.  See id.  Federal law would require the dismissal of the state statutory 
anti-retaliation claim due to the ministerial exception because the First Amendment 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment 
by incorporation.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  Additionally, the federal right would override a state 
statute that violated the First Amendment right under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See also Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian 
Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 836–37 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the First Amendment 
ministerial exception is a defense against state statutory anti-discrimination claims because 
the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment by 
incorporation, and the federal right bars any state statute that, as applied, violates the First 
Amendment). 
 57. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
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claim to enforce a protected right built into an employment anti-
discrimination statute.58 
The decision left two key legal questions open.  First, the Court’s eloquent 
explanation justifying the exception would appear to rightfully open the 
door to a religious group’s argument that it should have more freedom than 
the law provides to select its non-minister employees.59  Alternatively, the 
rationale for the exception indicates that courts should be generally inclined 
to accept at face value whomever a religious organization sincerely says is 
a “minister” for that particular religious group’s purposes.60  A church 
should be entitled to express its own values through its hiring decisions so 
that it can accomplish its mission in whatever way it desires.61  The 
concurrences of Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kagan are instructive on this 
point because they suggest considerable deference to a religious 
organization’s judgment about which employees are “ministers.”62  As 
                                                          
 58. The EEOC sued the Church alleging ADA retaliation.  Id. at 701.  Perich sued, 
alleging ADA and Michigan law retaliation claims.  Id.  Both sought Perich’s reinstatement 
to her former position (or front pay in lieu thereof), along with back pay, compensatory and 
punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other injunctive relief.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 706–07; see also Chopko & Parker, supra note 1, at 235, 272–73 (noting that 
“[h]ow ministry is defined and which entities are religious (enough) to assert constitutional 
rights must still be resolved,” while remarking that “the Court [in Hosanna-Tabor] decided 
that a ‘special rule’ was necessary to protect religious freedom principles, refusing to accept 
‘the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious 
organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.’”) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 
706). 
 60. See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.  The Court stated:  
The EEOC and Perich foresee a parade of horribles that will follow our recognition 
of a ministerial exception. . . .  [S]uch an exception could protect religious 
organizations from liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal 
misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury in a criminal trial. . . . [and] confer 
on religious employers “unfettered discretion” to violate employment laws. . . .  
Hosanna-Tabor responds that the ministerial exception would not in any way bar 
criminal prosecutions . . . [or] government enforcement of general laws restricting 
eligibility for employment. . . .  [T]he ministerial exception has been around in the 
lower courts for 40 years . . . and has not given rise to the dire consequences 
predicted by the EEOC and Perich. 
Id. 
 61. Id. (“The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). 
 62. See id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas wrote: 
[T]he Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and 
to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as 
its minister. . . .  The question whether an employee is a minister is itself religious 
in nature, and the answer will vary widely.  Judicial attempts to fashion a civil 
definition of “minister” through a bright-line test or multi-factor analysis risk 
disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and membership are 
outside of the “mainstream” or unpalatable to some.  Moreover, uncertainty about 
whether its ministerial designation will be rejected, and a corresponding fear of 
liability, may cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices regarding 
“ministers” to the prevailing secular understanding. 
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Justice Thomas notes, religious organizations in the United States vary 
widely as to leadership structure and doctrine concerning whom in a 
religious group has responsibility for spreading its spiritual mission.63  
Whether an individual is or is not a “minister” for purposes of the exception 
is essentially a religious question that is best determined by the religious 
group and not secular civil courts.64 
The second legal question left open by the Hosanna-Tabor Court is: what 
is the proper test or approach under the First Amendment for resolving 
minister suits against religious organizations based on alleged employment 
law violations that do not involve federal or state anti-discrimination and 
anti-retaliation statutes?  The Court stated: 
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought 
on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire 
her.  Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such 
a suit.  We express no view on whether the exception bars other 
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of 
contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.  There 
will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception 
to other circumstances if and when they arise.65 
There are a variety of possible minister employment suits beyond 
employment discrimination and retaliation claims.66  For example, a 
minister could sue his or her church for breach of contract, negligence-based 
claims, pension claims, or whistleblower claims arising out of the 
employment relationship.67  While Hosanna-Tabor was perhaps not the 
appropriate case to address the broader minister employment suit question, 
                                                          
Id. Justices Alito and Kagan concurred: 
[T]here is no principled basis for proscribing a pretext inquiry in such a case while 
permitting it in a case like the one now before us.  The Roman Catholic Church’s 
insistence on clerical celibacy may be much better known than the Lutheran 
Church’s doctrine of internal dispute resolution, but popular familiarity with a 
religious doctrine cannot be the determinative factor.  What matters in the present 
case is that Hosanna-Tabor believes that the religious function that respondent 
performed made it essential that she abide by the doctrine of internal dispute 
resolution; and the civil courts are in no position to second-guess that assessment.  
This conclusion rests not on respondent’s ordination status or her formal title, but 
rather on her functional status as the type of employee that a church must be free to 
appoint or dismiss in order to exercise the religious liberty that the First Amendment 
guarantees. 
Id. at 716 (Alito and Kagan, JJ., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 64. See id. at 710–11. 
 65. Id. at 710. 
 66. Id. (noting that minister employment claims can be addressed in criminal suits, 
breach of contract claims, or tortious conduct claims, for example). 
 67. See generally id. (discussing some of the claims that could arise between a minister 
and his or her religious organization). 
314 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:303 
other cases have provided that opportunity.68  It is important to look to pre 
and post-Hosanna-Tabor case law to see how the doctrine is developing 
with respect to the issue and to draw conclusions about how courts should 
be evaluating such claims.69 
A.  Breach of Contract Claims 
Both pre and post-Hosanna-Tabor courts have distinguished minister 
employment discrimination and retaliation suits from minister breach of 
contract suits under the First Amendment based on the voluntary principle.70  
In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church 
(pre-Hosanna-Tabor),71 a Methodist minister sued the United Methodist 
Church for breach of contract after he was denied a pastorship resulting in 
lost wages.72  The minister asserted two types of breach of contract claims.73  
First, the minister alleged that the Methodist Book of Discipline 
contractually required minister appointments to be made without regard to 
age, and, therefore, the church breached this age-based contractual 
provision when it denied him his preferred pastorship.74  The appellate court 
determined that the First Amendment barred the Book of Discipline contract 
claim because the interpretation of the appointment and anti-discrimination 
provisions of the Book of Discipline would involve highly speculative 
judgments that were spiritual and ecclesiastical in nature.75  Second, the 
minister asserted a breach of oral contract claim on the ground that the 
church’s district superintendent orally promised him a “move[] to a 
congregation more suited to his training and skills, and more appropriate in 
level of income, at the earliest appropriate time.”76  The appellate court ruled 
that the oral breach of contract claim survived the motion to dismiss stage.77  
The court reasoned that a church may burden its activities voluntarily 
through contracts, and that such contracts are enforceable in civil courts so 
long as interpreting the contract would not involve matters of ecclesiastical 
                                                          
 68. See id.; infra Part II.A. 
 69. See infra Part II.A. 
 70. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
1354, 1357, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the religious institution has the authority to 
evaluate the “gifts and graces” of a minister despite a claim of employment discrimination, 
but it must not conflict with “promises made and contracts formed”); DeBruin v. St. Patrick 
Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Wis. 2012) (finding that the court could not review 
whether the church improperly terminated a ministerial employee despite a possible breach 
of contract since the First Amendment protects church governance from state interference). 
 71. 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 72. Id. at 1355–56. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1358–59. 
 76. Id. at 1355. 
 77. Id. at 1361. 
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policy.78  It was unclear whether the oral breach of contract claim would 
involve a religious inquiry.  The court opined that the breach of contract 
issue could be adduced through neutral principles of law to the extent the 
dispute focused on whether the church district superintendent promised the 
minister another congregation, whether the minister provided consideration 
for the promise, and whether other congregations were available but not 
offered to the minister.79  But the court also warned that the suit would 
violate the Establishment Clause if the dispute turned into an inquiry 
concerning the church’s reasons for asserting that the minister was not 
suited for a particular pastorship because such an inquiry would constitute 
an excessive entanglement in the church’s affairs.80 
In Petruska v. Gannon University (pre-Hosanna-Tabor),81 a university 
chaplain who qualified as a minister for purposes of the ministerial 
exception to Title VII sued the university, alleging breach of contract with 
respect to the restructuring of her job duties.82  Like the Minker court, the 
Petruska court started its analysis of the breach of contract claim by pointing 
out that enforcement of minister employment contracts does not inherently 
violate the First Amendment because “application of state contract law does 
not involve government-imposed limits on [a church’s] right to select its 
ministers.”83  The Third Circuit stated that enforcing a contractual 
employment promise between a minister and his or her religious 
organization would not violate the organization’s Free Exercise rights 
because the contractual promise is voluntary in nature.84  As for 
Establishment Clause concerns, the court concluded that the resolution of 
the chaplain’s breach of contract claim did not involve “excessive 
entanglement” or “ecclesiastical inquiry” at the motion to dismiss stage.85  
As the case progressed, if the university’s responses to the plaintiff’s breach 
of contract allegations raised an ecclesiastical inquiry, the district court 
could correctly dismiss the claim on summary judgment.86 
In Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary (post-Hosanna-Tabor),87 a 
tenured Christian social ethics professor at a Christian seminary sued the 
seminary for breach of contract under Kentucky law after the seminary 
                                                          
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1360. 
 80. Id. at 1359–61.  As the court noted, “the contract alleged by Minker threatens to 
touch the core of the rights protected by the free exercise clause.”  Id. at 1360. 
 81. 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 82. Id. at 301–02. 
 83. Id. at 310. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 312. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014). 
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terminated his employment.88  The Faculty Handbook, which governed the 
employment relationship between the professor and the seminary, provided 
that “[t]he only grounds for dismissal of a tenured faculty member are moral 
delinquency, unambiguous failure to perform the responsibilities outlined 
in this Handbook, or conduct detrimental to the Seminary.”89  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court determined that the seminary is a religious institution and 
the professor was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception to 
Title VII.90  The court concluded that the professor’s breach of contract 
claim was permitted under the First Amendment because enforcement of 
the contractual arrangement between the seminary and the professor did not 
cause governmental interference with the seminary’s selection of its 
ministers, and the contract did not concern religious matters that would 
prohibit the suit under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.91 
As in Minker and Petruska, the Kirby court emphasized that enforcement 
of contractual restrictions on a religious institution’s right or ability to select 
its ministers does not arise out of governmental involvement, but instead 
arises from a voluntary agreement between the religious organization and 
the minister.92  Here, the Seminary voluntarily agreed through a tenure 
system to fire tenured professors, including tenured professors who are 
ministers, “only under specified conditions.”93  The Seminary’s decision to 
fire the tenured “minister” professor plaintiff was “completely free of any 
government involvement or restriction.”94  Taking it one step further, the 
court opined that enforcing minister employment contracts according to 
their terms actually furthers church autonomy because “religious 
institutions are free to set forth policies that align with their respective 
mission.”95 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 601. 
 89. Id. at 603. 
 90. Id. at 609–12.  The Seminary was religiously affiliated with the Christian Church 
(Disciples of Christ).  Id. at 609.  The Seminary had a covenant relationship with the church 
and received its principal funding from the church.  Id.  The professor’s “extensive 
involvement in the Seminary’s mission, religious ceremonies, and the subject matter of [the 
professor’s] teaching” qualified him as a ministerial employee for purposes of the Title VII 
exception.  The Seminary issued him a call to serve in his professorial capacity.  Id. at 611.  
The professor’s teaching focused on Christian socio-ethical issues.  Id.  As part of his 
employment, the professor participated and preached during various religious events 
connected to the Seminary.  Id. at 612. 
 91. Id. at 615. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 617.  See also id. at 616 (“[T]he Seminary explicitly stated in writing that it 
would only terminate a tenured professor on three grounds: (1) ‘moral delinquency,’ (2) 
‘unambiguous failure to perform the responsibilities outlined in [the Faculty] Handbook’ and 
(3) ‘conduct detrimental to the Seminary.’”). 
 94. Id. at 617. 
 95. Id. at 616. 
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The Kirby court also confidently proclaimed that the tenured professor’s 
breach of contract claim could be decided using neutral principles of law 
without wading into “doctrinal [religious] waters.”96  The court described 
the professor’s tenure rights under the Faculty Handbook as unambiguous 
and concluded that considering the contract issue would not lead to any 
entanglement with “church doctrine or polity.”97  The court honed in on the 
heart of the matter as follows: 
Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the question at the 
heart of whether [the minister-professor’s] contract claim should 
be allowed is “whether [the minister-professor’s] breach of 
contract claim can be decided without wading into doctrinal 
waters.”  When we consider the elements of breach of contract, as 
well as the particular contract at issue, we find no reason why a 
secular court is not able adequately to enforce the documents 
governing [the minister-professor’s] former relationship with the 
Seminary.98 
The court articulated that its green light to move forward with the breach 
of contract claim heeded the cautionary warning signals from Hosanna-
Tabor.99  If the professor eventually proved the elements of the contract 
claim, he would receive “compensatory damages, not specific performance 
or reinstatement,” as reinstatement would “entail a secular court deciding 
who speaks for the church” and is constitutionally prohibited.100  The 
penalty prohibition point made in the Hosanna-Tabor employment 
discrimination context was viewed as inapposite when applied to a damages 
award for breach of contract.101  A damages award would not penalize the 
church, as no penalty is suffered where a secular court enforces a contractual 
employment agreement negotiated and agreed to in good faith between the 
minister and the religious organization.102 
The Kentucky Supreme Court appeared certain in Kirby that the minister-
professor’s tenure-based employment rights could be interpreted without 
regard to religious doctrine or policy.103  But interpreting a minister’s 
employment agreement against the backdrop of explicit or implicit 
religious-based beliefs, ideas, and principles followed by a religious 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 620. 
 97. Id. at 619–20. 
 98. Id. at 620 (footnote omitted). 
 99. Id. at 615 (finding that the contract claim could proceed because enforcement of the 
contract between Kirby and the Seminary did not raise concerns of government interference 
in minister selection and the contract did not raise any ecclesiastical concerns that would bar 
the suit under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine). 
 100. Id. at 620. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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organization would seem to be a difficult and dangerous task under the 
Establishment Clause.  In DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation (post-
Hosanna-Tabor),104 the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a minister’s 
breach of employment contract claim and concluded that resolving the claim 
would violate the First Amendment.105  The decision was splintered; the 
plurality dismissed the claim on First Amendment grounds, the concurrence 
avoided the constitutional question through contracts interpretation, and the 
dissent would have permitted the breach of contract claim to proceed.106 
In DeBruin, the minister, a Director of Faith Formation, entered into a 
one-year employment agreement with a local Catholic church in the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee.107  It was undisputed that the individual was a 
ministerial employee for purposes of the ministerial exception to Title 
VII.108  The contract stated: “The PARISH agrees that the DIRECTOR OF 
FAITH FORMATION shall not be discharged during the term of this 
contract, without good and sufficient cause, which shall be determined by 
the PARISH.”109  The church terminated the minister before the one-year 
term expired.110  The minister sued for breach of the employment contract, 
alleging that there was not “good and sufficient cause” for the discharge, 
and sought money damages for the contractual violation.111  The church 
moved to dismiss the suit under the First Amendment and a related 
Wisconsin constitutional provision.112  The state circuit court dismissed the 
claim, and the state court of appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court on appeal.113 
A plurality concluded that the “good and sufficient cause” language in 
the contract could not be interpreted and applied to the facts of this case by 
a secular court without infringing upon the church’s First Amendment right 
to freely exercise its religious preferences through its ministerial 
selection.114  The majority reasoned that the resolution of the contractual 
claim would involve an inquiry into the church’s reasons for firing the 
minister and that the mere inquiry itself would “involve consideration of 
ecclesiastical decision-making” that is prohibited by the First 
Amendment.115  Furthermore, resolving the contractual claim would violate 
                                                          
 104. 816 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 2012). 
 105. Id. at 890. 
 106. Id.; id. at 894 (Crooks, J., concurring); id. at 913 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 883 (majority). 
 108. Id. at 883–84.  See also id. at 883 n.5. 
 109. Id. at 883. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 883–84. 
 113. Id. at 882, 884. 
 114. See id. at 887–90. 
 115. Id. at 889.  See also id. at 887–90. 
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the First Amendment because the “Amendment gives [the church] the 
absolute right to terminate [the minister] for any reason, or for no reason, as 
it freely exercises its religious views.  It is the decision itself, i.e., who shall 
be the voice of [the church], that affects the faith and mission of the 
church.”116  The majority accepted the penalty prohibition from Hosanna-
Tabor as apposite: if the State required the church to pay a damages award 
on the breach of contract claim it would unconstitutionally penalize the 
church for terminating an “unwanted ministerial employee.”117 
Two concurring justices concluded that the “good and sufficient cause” 
clause was “illusory” under Wisconsin contract law.118  By assigning to the 
church the right to determine whether “good and sufficient cause” exists, 
the contract effectively nullified the “without cause” protection and 
rendered the minister subject to employment-at-will.119  Through this 
viewpoint, these justices avoided the First Amendment question.120 
The dissenting justice conceptualized the First Amendment issues 
concerning the minister’s breach of contract claim in a similar way to the 
Minker, Petruska, and Kirby courts.121  The dissent started with the 
proposition that the enforcement of a minister’s employment contract with 
his or her religious organization does not involve a “mandate from the state” 
and is voluntary.122  Therefore, enforcement of such a contract does not 
constitute a Free Exercise Clause violation.123  In fact, the dissent articulated 
the notion that church autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause is furthered 
by enforcing such contracts, commenting that the lack of enforcement of 
such agreements may prohibit religious organizations from recruiting the 
best candidates for their positions because candidates would not be able to 
rely on the employer’s security promises.124  They stated: 
If the ministerial exception . . . were extended to bar contract 
claims, then termination clauses would not be worth the paper 
they were printed on because no civil authority could hold a 
religious organization to the terms of any such contracts it had 
negotiated with a ministerial employee.  Candidates for 
ministerial positions might be less inclined to enter into these 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 888. 
 117. Id. at 889–90. 
 118. Id. at 891–94 (Crooks, J., concurring) (discussing further the contractual promise in 
light of state contract law).  See also id. at 898–99 (Prosser, J., concurring) (stating that “the 
protection that [the minister] relies on does not exist” and that “[f]rom [the Church’s] 
perspective, it did not breach the contract; it exercised its rights under the contract”). 
 119. Id. at 891–95 (Crooks, J., concurring), 898–99 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 906 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 907. 
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types of employment arrangements in the first instance.  A 
church’s ability to recruit the best and brightest candidates for 
ministerial positions could be undermined because the church 
would be unable to offer desirable candidates any contractual 
assurances regarding job security.125 
The dissenters conceded that excessive entanglement in violation of the 
Establishment Clause could arise if a trial court actually evaluated the 
Church’s reasons for terminating the minister; however, the record was not 
developed enough to understand the basis for the church’s decision and 
whether it involved matters of “faith and ministry” that would entail 
excessive entanglement.126  For these reasons, the dissenters would have 
denied the motion to dismiss and remanded to the lower court for further 
proceedings.127 
B.  Whistleblower Claims 
Minister whistleblower claims pose unique analytical issues under the 
First Amendment that are distinct from First Amendment analysis under 
minister statutory employment discrimination claims, minister statutory 
employment retaliation claims, minister breach of employment contract 
claims, and even minister employment-based tort suits.128  For purposes of 
this Article, whistleblower claims are defined as both common law and 
statutory claims where an employee is engaging in protected conduct to 
uphold a non-employment public interest. 
Whistleblower claims are not the same as anti-retaliation claims.129  
Whistleblower claims are distinct from anti-retaliation claims in two 
fundamental ways that impact a minister’s whistleblower claim under the 
First Amendment.  First, whistleblower claims are different from 
employment-based anti-retaliation claims brought under anti-retaliation 
laws like Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA)—laws that prohibit retaliatory employment actions against 
employees who report or oppose violations of such employment laws—in 
that whistleblower claims often impact the public interest in matters 
unrelated to employment, while anti-retaliation laws generally protect 
employment rights.130  Second, the underlying policy reason for protecting 
                                                          
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 907–08. 
 127. Id. at 908. 
 128. See infra text accompanying notes 129–36, 140–45. 
 129. See infra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 130. CARLSON & MOSS, supra note 10, at 751–52.  See also Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (prohibiting retaliatory disciplinary actions by 
employers); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) 
(prohibiting retaliatory employment action against employees who oppose unlawful practices 
under the ADEA). 
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employee whistleblowers is that their reporting protects a policy interest that 
either impacts the public at large or more specifically affects a third party.131   
The public policy interest underlying anti-discrimination and anti-
retaliation laws is arguably different than the interest supporting 
whistleblower laws.132  Although anti-retaliation laws may be used to 
protect employees who complain about employer actions against other 
employees, third parties, or employees who are punished by their employers 
for having a close relationship with an individual who engages in protected 
conduct,133 it is more often the case that an anti-retaliation plaintiff is suing 
an employer for taking an adverse employment action against the plaintiff 
because the plaintiff complained about the violation of his own statutory 
rights.134  For example, a Title VII retaliation plaintiff might sue his 
employer for withdrawing an employment offer because he accused his 
supervisor of discriminating against him based on his national origin.135  
Employment anti-discrimination statutes and employment anti-retaliation 
statutes focus on protecting the individual employee, while whistleblower 
laws often protect a broader societal interest.136 
Hosanna-Tabor can be interpreted as barring employment-based anti-
retaliation claims in which the minister either opposed a practice made 
unlawful by the relevant employment law or engaged in protected conduct 
under that employment law.137  In fact, as explained in Part II, the minister’s 
claim in Hosanna-Tabor was actually an employment-based anti-retaliation 
claim and not a straight discrimination claim based on the minister’s 
protected characteristic, which in itself supports this point.138  Recall that in 
Hosanna-Tabor the minister sued the church for unlawfully retaliating 
against her by asserting rights under the ADA.139 
                                                          
 131. See Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: 
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 
1635 (2008). 
 132. See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011).  See also Alex B. 
Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of 
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2007). 
 134. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013).  In 
Nassar, the plaintiff asserted a Title VII retaliation claim alleging that his employer retaliated 
against him because he complained to his employer about his supervisor’s national origin-
based harassment.  Id. 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 2523–24 (involving a Title VII retaliation claim on the basis of 
national origin). 
 136. Sinzdak, supra note 131, at 1635. 
 137. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012). 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
 139. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
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Minister whistleblower claims are also conceptually different from 
minister breach of employment contract claims for First Amendment 
purposes.  Whistleblower claims stem from mandatory state regulations that 
could influence a church’s choice of leaders, whereas breaches of contract 
claims arguably do not flow from any regulatory state mandate.140  Breach 
of contract claims involve voluntary, freely negotiated agreements between 
the church and the minister with less risk of the state influencing a church’s 
selection of its leaders.141  The Kirby, Petruska, and Minker opinions and 
the DeBruin dissent all note and expound upon the voluntary aspect of 
minister employment contracts.142  From the perspective of mandated state 
regulation, minister whistleblower claims are more like the barred minister 
employment discrimination claims than minister breach of contract 
claims.143 
The minister whistleblower claim distinctions raise the question of how 
courts should treat minister whistleblower claims under the First 
Amendment.  Computer-assisted research reveals various appellate court 
decisions regarding whether minister whistleblower suits are barred under 
the First Amendment.144  The cases arise both before and after Hosanna-
                                                          
 140. See, e.g., Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2010) (noting that many clergy are subject to mandatory reporting requirements); 
supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra Part II.A (discussing the way in which courts have used the voluntary 
principal to distinguish retaliation cases from breach of contract cases). 
 142. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 615 (Ky. 2014) 
(“Contractual transactions, and the resulting obligations, are assumed voluntarily.”); Petruska 
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (“On its face, application of state contract 
law does not involve government-imposed limits on Gannon’s right to select its ministers: 
Unlike the duties under Title VII and state tort law, contractual obligations are entirely 
voluntary.”); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through 
contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”); DeBruin v. St. Patrick 
Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 906 (Wis. 2012) (Bradley, J., dissenting).  The dissent in 
DeBruin noted: 
St. Patrick voluntarily selected its minister, freely negotiated the terms of 
employment including the circumstances under which the minister could be fired, 
and willingly agreed that both parties would be bound by those terms.  Allowing 
DeBruin’s contract claims to survive a motion to dismiss would merely recognize 
that St. Patrick, “like any other person or organization,” is bound by its contracts. 
Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 
(4th Cir. 1985)). 
 143. See supra notes 129–42 and accompanying text (discussing the different types of 
claims and showing how there are more similarities between whistleblower and employment 
discrimination claims than there are with contract claims). 
 144. Through a LexisNexis search of the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor decision, 
every state and federal appellate court decision that cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hosanna-
Tabor opinion can be found and reviewed. 
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Tabor, but there is not a significant amount of authority.  Hosanna-Tabor 
lends itself to different interpretations as to how to resolve these claims.145 
A straightforward way to analyze minister whistleblower suits under the 
First Amendment is to say that employment discrimination and retaliation 
statutes are the same as whistleblower statutes because they both concern 
statutory regulation from the state.  A pre-Hosanna-Tabor line of cases is 
instructive. 
In Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing,146 a Michigan appellate 
court ruled that the ministerial exception barred a Catholic school religious 
instructor’s Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act claim.147  The 
reasoning went straight to the employment law statutory analogy point.  The 
appellate court noted that the ministerial exception “generally takes 
precedence over statutorily based claims.”148  The court explained that both 
employment discrimination claims and whistleblower claims “have as a 
common purpose the prevention of discrimination in employment on the 
basis of statutorily recognized factors rooted in public policy.”149  
Therefore, the court ruled, “the rationale for recognizing the existence of the 
ministerial exception to a claim under the [Michigan state anti-
discrimination statute] seems to apply equally to a claim under the 
[Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act].”150  The court recognized that 
some might find it unjust that ministers can be terminated for reporting 
illegal activities that the law requires them to report, but concluded that to 
rule otherwise would violate the First Amendment.151 
In Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. Miñagorri,152 a Florida appellate court 
ruled that the ministerial exception barred a Catholic school principal’s 
Florida Private Sector Whistleblower Act claim.153  The principal reported 
to the Archdiocese that her supervisor “grabbed her by the arm and verbally 
threatened her.”154  Citing other cases in which courts had determined that 
the ministerial exception barred anti-discrimination claims, breach of 
contract claims, and tort claims, the court concluded that there was “no 
                                                          
 145. See generally id.  See also infra notes 146–94 and accompanying text (discussing 
different courts’ approaches to whistleblower claims). 
 146. 787 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010). 
 147. Id. at 519. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 521 (“We recognize that it seems unjust that employees of religious institutions 
can be fired without recourse for reporting illegal activities, particularly given that members 
of the clergy, as well as teachers, are mandated reporters.  However, to conclude otherwise 
would result in pervasive violations of First Amendment protections.”). 
 152. 954 So.2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 153. Id. at 642–44. 
 154. Id. at 641. 
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reason why the ministerial exception should not be applied to the instant 
whistleblower claim.”155 
Beyond the statutory analogy, there is an argument for a deeper look into 
the validity of a minister whistleblower suit if one believes that 
whistleblower statutes affect the public interest and third parties in a way 
that employment discrimination and employment retaliation statutes do 
not.156  During the Supreme Court oral argument in Hosanna-Tabor, Justice 
Sotomayor raised a challenging hypothetical concerning a minister-teacher 
who reports sexual abuse of a child to the government and is fired because 
of that report.157  She queried how that situation would be resolved under 
the First Amendment and asked for a framework for resolving the case.158  
In other words, would the minister whistleblower receive employment 
protection for the report because the governmental interest in protecting 
children from sexual abuse outweighs the church’s broad right to hire and 
fire its ministers free from governmental intrusion?  In response to the 
question, Hosanna-Tabor’s counsel opined that such a whistleblower suit 
would still present a question as to the reason for the discharge, and the First 
Amendment should be interpreted to prevent the government from 
interfering with a religious organization’s personnel decision in such a 
case.159  However, counsel also stated upon further questioning that the law 
might create an exception for circumstances when the governmental 
concern is protecting children.160  Counsel articulated the following 
theoretical framework for such a minister whistleblower suit: 
[F]irst you have to identify the government’s interest in 
regulation.  If the government’s interest is in protecting ministers 
from discrimination, we are squarely within the heart of the 
ministerial exception.  If the government’s interest is something 
quite different from that, like protecting the children, then you can 
assess whether that government interest is sufficiently compelling 
to justify interfering with the relationship between the church and 
its ministers.  But the government’s interest is at its nadir when 
the claim is: We want to protect these ministers as such.  We want 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 643. 
 156. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553). 
 157. Id. at 4–5. 
 158. Id. at 5–6. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 6.  Hosanna-Tabor’s counsel stated: 
I understand that concern, and that was my second point, that if you want to carve 
out an exception for cases like child abuse where the government’s interest is in 
protecting the child, not an interest in protecting the minister, when you get such a 
case, we think you could carve out that exception. 
Id. 
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to tell the churches what criteria they should apply for . . . 
selecting and removing ministers.161 
Justice Sotomayor’s minister whistleblower suit scenario based on 
termination for reporting child abuse came to life in a real case decided by 
an Indiana appellate court after the Hosanna-Tabor decision.162  In Ballaban 
v. Bloomington Jewish Community,163 a Jewish rabbi claimed the Jewish 
religious organization unlawfully terminated his employment because he 
reported alleged child abuse committed by a teacher in violation of an 
Indiana state child abuse reporting statute.164  The statute made it a criminal 
offense to fail to report child abuse.165  The Indiana appellate court raised 
the issue of whether the ministerial exception barred the rabbi’s 
whistleblower claim—framed as an unlawful employment termination 
claim for refusing to commit the criminal offense of failing to report child 
abuse—but then avoided deciding the matter.166  The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment to the employer 
because the record demonstrated that the rabbi was fired for reasons 
unrelated to his report of the alleged child abuse.167  A concurrence 
suggested that the ministerial exception would not bar the minister’s claim 
for unlawful termination because of a report of child abuse, and more 
broadly stated that the ministerial exception does not permit a church to fire 
a minister for refusing to commit a criminal act.168 
The difficult case of a minister whistleblower suit allegeing wrongful 
employment terminiation for reporting child abuse has the potential to 
create bad law if it were to create an unlimited exception to the ministerial 
exception.169  Reasonable people should agree that the government has a 
strong societal interest in using civil laws (such as mandatory reporting 
statutes) to stop child abuse.  Thus, a rule that precludes ministers from 
                                                          
 161. Id. at 6–7. 
 162. Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Community, 982 N.E.2d 329, 331–32 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2013). 
 163. 982 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).  
 164. Id. at 331–33. 
 165. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2015) (requiring that an individual with reason 
to believe a child is abused make a report); id. § 31-33-5-2(a) (requiring that an individual 
notify the individual in charge of the entity where the alleged abuse is taking place); id. § 31-
33-6-1 (noting those who may be immune from civil and criminal liability for child abuse 
accusations); id. § 31-33-6-2 (stating that immunity is not attached to those who act in bad 
faith or maliciously); id. § 31-33-6-3 (assuming that an individual making a child abuse report 
has acted in good faith). 
 166. Ballaban, 982 N.E.2d at 339. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 341–43 (Vaidik, J., concurring). 
 169. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553) (discussing the 
possibility of a “carve out” to the ministerial exception in situations such as child abuse 
reporting). 
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employment protection for making such reports may seem contrary to the 
behavior society would want to encourage.  Nonetheless, other minister 
whistleblower suits would undoubtedly present societal interests that are 
less persuasive and deserving of protection, as not all interests furthered by 
whistleblower protection laws are equally meritorious.170  Moreover, 
governments have other mechanisms beyond whistleblower protection laws 
for addressing the underlying public interest at stake in such cases.171  In 
minister whistleblower cases other than the report of child abuse 
hypothetical, the balance would seem to tilt in favor of church autonomy in 
ministerial selection over a nebulous societal interest underlying the 
applicable whistleblower protection law.172  Consider the following post-
Hosanna-Tabor minister “whistleblower” case and how the appellate court 
analyzed it.173 
In Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church,174 the Washington 
Supreme Court faced a balancing act between a church’s autonomy to select 
its ministers without government interference and furtherance of an alleged 
institutional interest raised by a church employee whistleblower.175  The 
case concerned the decision of the Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church in Gig 
Harbor, Washington (a part of the hierarchically structured U.S. 
Presbyterian Church) to dismiss a church executive after she made a variety 
of complaints against the Church’s Senior Pastor that were reviewed in 
accordance with the Church’s internal dispute resolution procedures and 
determined by the Church to be unfounded.176  The Church’s Session 
Committee considered the executive’s grievances and determined that the 
plaintiff’s actions indicated that she “failed to follow the scriptural teaching 
concerning our relationships within the body of Christ.”177  After the 
internal grievance procedure pursuant to the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)’s 
Book of Order ran its course, the church evidently decided to terminate the 
executive from her employment, and she subsequently sued the church in a 
civil court for negligent retention and supervision of the Senior Pastor.178  
The genesis of the dispute arose from the executive’s persistent complaints 
to the Senior Pastor and the Church that the Senior Pastor was allegedly 
jeopardizing the church’s tax-exempt status by receiving compensation 
                                                          
 170. See generally Nathan A. Adams IV, Distinguishing Chicken Little from Bona Fide 
Whistleblowers, 83 FLA. B.J. 100, 100–01 (2009) (distinguishing whistleblower claims that 
are genuine from those that are not). 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 159–61; infra text accompanying notes 174–94. 
 173. See infra text accompanying notes 174–94. 
 174. 286 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2012). 
 175. See id. at 369. 
 176. Id. at 360–62. 
 177. Id. at 361–62. 
 178. Id. 
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from a tour company for publicizing international tours at religious sites 
within the Church.179  The Senior Pastor and church investigated the matter 
and determined the concerns were without merit.180  However, the rift in the 
working relationship between the two apparently was not healed and the 
executive claimed that the Senior Pastor physically intimidated her, verbally 
abused her, and harassed her after her complaints.181  While the case was 
brought as a negligence suit, it can also be considered a whistleblower suit 
because the plaintiff alleged she was shedding light on an improper action 
by a church agent that affected an interest beyond her own—presumably the 
church’s interest in maintaining tax-exempt status—and that she deserved 
employment protection for that behavior.182  In another sense, the alleged 
harassment implicates the executive’s own personal interest in bodily 
integrity.183 
The Erdman court barred the executive’s negligent retention and 
negligent supervision claim from proceeding on First Amendment 
grounds.184  From a doctrinal perspective, the majority and dissenting 
opinions are illuminating for a variety of reasons.  The majority declined to 
decide whether the executive was a minister of the church for purposes of 
the ministerial exception because of the view that the record was not 
sufficiently developed to decide the matter under Hosanna-Tabor.185  Not 
surprisingly, however, the policies underlying the basis for the ministerial 
exception and ecclesiastical abstention doctrines dominate the majority’s 
opinion.186  The majority reasoned that consideration of the executive’s 
claims would unconstitutionally interfere with a church’s selection of its 
ministers, specifically retention and supervision of the Senior Pastor.187  
Both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses would be violated if the 
claims were decided by a civil court because a court’s insertion into the 
dispute would infringe the church’s right to select and supervise its clergy 
free from governmental interference and would entangle the state in 
determining the church’s religious beliefs and doctrines.188  The church’s 
decision arising from the internal dispute resolution procedure demonstrated 
that the church considered scripture and church doctrine in arriving at a 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 360. 
 180. Id. at 362. 
 181. Id. at 361–62. 
 182. See id. at 360. 
 183. See generally id. at 363; see also id. at 372 (Fairhurst, J., concurring) (detailing 
allegations of physical harassment). 
 184. Id. at 363 (majority). 
 185. Id. at 362–63. 
 186. See id. at 369–70. 
 187. See id. at 368. 
 188. See id. at 365–66. 
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result.189  The majority articulated that the “neutral principles of law” 
approach had no place in the case.190  Finally, the majority agreed that the 
church’s decision should receive deference as a final decision of a 
“hierarchical religious organization.”191 
The dissent argued that bringing the ministerial exception into the case 
was problematic given that there was no finding that the plaintiff-executive 
actually qualified as a minister.192  By viewing the Senior Pastor and the 
church as alleged tortfeasors and the plaintiff as a non-minister, the dissent 
would have applied a neutral principles of law approach to the case.193  
However, because the church’s hierarchical body issued a decision in the 
matter, the dissent would have abstained and deferred to that decision.194 
C.  Tort Claims 
As the Erdman decision demonstrates, minister tort-based employment 
claims against congregations may bear a striking resemblance to statutory 
whistleblower claims.  They are conceptually similar in that both involve 
mandated state regulation.  Both types of claims may substantially interfere 
with church autonomy over its selection of ministers and improperly 
entangle the government in religious faith, beliefs, and doctrines.195  Courts 
disagree whether “neutral principles of law” could properly resolve minister 
tort suits against religious institutions.196 
                                                          
 189. See id. at 368–69. 
 190. Id. at 368.  The court stated: 
[T]here is no room for the “neutral principles of law” approach in the case of civil 
tort claims brought against a church involving its authority to hire and control its 
ministers.  Whether the situation involves religious reasons or interpretation of 
religious scripture or doctrine is not determinative of the First Amendment 
protections to the church. . . .  A civil court is not entitled to interfere with or 
intervene in a church’s selection and supervision of its ministers . . . . 
Id. 
 191. Id. at 369–70. 
 192. Id. at 372–73 (Chambers, J., dissenting in part). 
 193. See id. at 375–76. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Bilbrey v. Myers, 91 So. 3d 887, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (stating 
how some courts refuse to adjudicate most tort claims against religious institutions because 
the conduct leading to the claims is often entangled with church doctrine and administration); 
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 309 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that a minister’s civil 
conspiracy, negligent supervision, and retention claims against a religious institution were 
barred on First Amendment grounds). 
 196. Compare Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357, 368 (Wash. 
2012) (“[T]here is no room for the ‘neutral principles of law’ approach in the case of civil tort 
claims brought against a church involving its authority to hire and control its ministers.”), 
with Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28 A.3d 1171, 1177 (Md. 2011) (noting 
that “[n]umerous courts have recognized that tort claims based on harassment are not barred 
by the First Amendment,” and stating that such claims would not be barred insofar as they 
“do not implicate any employment decisions or religious beliefs”).  See also Weishuhn v. 
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III.  A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO MINISTER EMPLOYMENT LAWSUITS 
Minister employment suits against churches should be placed into five 
categories with different analyses: (1) category one contains employment 
discrimination/employment retaliation claims; (2) category two contains 
breach of employment contract claims; (3) category three contains 
whistleblower claims; (4) category four contains tort claims; and (5) 
category five contains miscellaneous claims. 
A.  Category One: Employment Discrimination and Retaliation Claims 
Category one is the Hosanna-Tabor category.  For purposes of this 
categorization, Hosanna-Tabor is interpreted as barring federal and state 
employment anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation claims where a minister 
is suing the religious organization based on employment termination or 
adverse employment action.  If a minister employment suit falls in this 
category, it is barred for the reasons expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the Hosanna-Tabor decision. 
B.  Category Two: Breach of Employment Contract Claims 
Minister breach of employment contract claims should be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.  A per se rule that would prohibit secular courts from 
hearing all minister breach of employment contract claims is too broad.  
Contract claims are fundamentally different from other statutory and 
common law employment law claims because such claims are freely 
negotiated between the minister and the church without a state mandate.197  
Churches could actually benefit if some contractual provisions between 
minister and church were enforceable in secular courts.198  Some limited 
governmental intervention in interpreting contractual rights under the 
neutral principles of law that both parties voluntarily agreed to seems a 
prudent approach that would not substantially interfere with a religious 
organization’s autonomy to select its ministers.199  The problem with 
minister breach of employment contract cases is that many of them cannot 
be decided without the government evaluating the religious organization’s 
beliefs and doctrine, and, therefore, presumably would still be barred on 
                                                          
Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that some 
minister “independent” tort-based employment actions against a church that do not concern 
the minister’s termination are not foreclosed by the ministerial exception). 
 197. See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310. 
 198. See DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 907 (Wis. 2012) 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[I]f courts routinely dismissed this variety of contract claim, they 
might create an unnecessary roadblock hampering a church’s free exercise ability to select its 
ministers. . . .  Candidates for ministerial positions might be less inclined to enter into these 
types of employment arrangements in the first instance.”). 
 199. See generally Chopko & Parker, supra note 1, at 300–01 (discussing some of the 
dangers of not permitting a ministerial exception). 
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ecclesiastical abstention grounds.200  Take the DeBruin and Kirby cases as 
examples.  DeBruin was correctly decided; Kirby was not. 
In DeBruin, the minister and the church bargained for a one-year term 
employment agreement with protection for dismissal except for “good and 
sufficient cause, which shall be determined by the PARISH.”201  The 
language gives one hundred percent of the legal judgment as to the basis for 
the dismissal to the church and, in reality, does nothing to take the minister 
out of at-will employment.202  A plurality of the court made such a finding, 
although under different conceptions of the case.203  But consider if the 
contract had just limited discharge to “good and sufficient cause.”  From the 
church’s perspective, it will decide “good and sufficient cause” as to the 
minister’s job performance in the context of its own religious beliefs, 
traditions, and values.204  Realistically, a secular civil court might have no 
way to apply neutral principles of secular law to second-guess the court’s 
judgment about a minister’s discharge that would not involve the state 
sticking its nose in an area of the church’s purview in which it has no 
business.205  From an employment security perspective, it would be quite 
difficult to contractually overcome the presumption of at-will employment 
for a minister unless there was a specific waiver by the church of its First 
Amendment rights and specific agreement for a court to interpret the plain 
language under neutral secular principles.206  These waivers pose questions 
because the First Amendment implicates structural interests in the 
relationship between church and state that go beyond the personal interests 
of the parties. 
In Kirby, the appellate court stated that a secular court can apply neutral 
principles of law to consider whether a minister was legally fired under a 
                                                          
 200. See, e.g., DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 885 (“[T]he First Amendment grants religious 
institutions ‘independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide 
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine.’”) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012)). 
 201. Id. at 883. 
 202. See id. at 892 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
 203. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text. 
 204. See DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 894 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
 205. See id. at 899 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Justice Prosser wrote: 
To prevail, DeBruin would have to persuade a court to enter into an internal parish 
conflict and second guess the parish’s decision.  It would have to deny St. Patrick 
the power to make a decision that it explicitly reserved to itself.  This cannot be 
squared with any reasonable view of religious liberty. 
Id. 
 206. See generally Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 A.2d 218, 224 
(N.J. 1992) (holding that “[a]lthough . . . a religious organization and adherent may, in their 
employment contract, affect the right to act or refrain from acting in conformance with 
religious strictures,” the court could not enforce provisions in a religious organization’s 
employment manual that “are both vague and clearly optional”). 
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supposedly unambiguous tenure agreement.207  Recall that the tenure 
contract provided that “[t]he only grounds for dismissal of a tenured faculty 
member are moral delinquency, unambiguous failure to perform the 
responsibilities outlined in this Handbook, or conduct detrimental to the 
Seminary.”208  The religious organization will apply language such as 
“moral delinquency” and “conduct detrimental to the Seminary” to its 
minister according to its religious beliefs, values, and faith tradition, which 
it should have the First Amendment right to do.209  However, a secular court 
would likely improperly look to how similar language is interpreted by 
courts in the context of non-religious cases where professors were fired by 
universities for improper conduct.210  The comparisons are inapt. 
There are likely minister breach of employment contract claims that could 
be resolvesd without violating the First Amendment.  For example, consider 
a breach of contract wage dispute claim where the minister argues that he 
or she had a contract for a certain wage and was not paid for his or her 
services according to the contractual terms.211  This scenario is unlikely to 
involve or implicate religious doctrines, beliefs, administration, and values. 
A final point regarding minister breach of employment contract claims:  
there can be no doubt that if a court is able to rule on such a claim, the 
remedy would have to be limited to damages as opposed to specific 
performance or reinstatement.212  The First Amendment prohibits a secular 
civil court from telling a religious institution that it must reinstate a minister 
whose contractual employment rights were violated.213 
C.  Category Three: Whistleblower Claims 
Minister whistleblower claims are the type of employment law claims 
that, if permitted, pose the greatest danger to a religious institution’s 
autonomy over its selection of ministers.  The societal interests that underlie 
whistleblower laws are varied and difficult to categorize in terms of 
importance and value.  A rule that permits ministers to sue for whistleblower 
law violations would impinge on religious liberty in a significant way that 
                                                          
 207. See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 618, 620 (Ky. 
2014). 
 208. Id. at 603. 
 209. Id. at 616. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 620. 
 213. See id.  The court stated: 
[W]e emphasize that [the minister] is seeking compensatory damages, not specific 
performance or reinstatement [for the alleged breach of the minister’s employment 
contract].  We think there is little doubt that reinstatement is an unavailable remedy 
in all actions because that would entail a secular court deciding who speaks for the 
church.  That we cannot do. 
Id. 
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would harm religious institutions and society.214  Yet a rule that disallows 
all minister whistleblower claims may stretch too far in discouraging 
ministers from reporting harms suffered by third parties. 
The appropriate response to this conundrum is to err on the side of 
protecting religious organizations’ free exercise rights to select their 
religious leaders free from governmental intrusion.215  A whistleblower law 
should only apply to a minister when the basis for the whistleblower law is 
in furtherance of a governmental interest that is so convincing that it would 
override the religious institution’s usual dominant interest in plenary 
freedom to select its ministers.216  Therefore, the First Amendment requires 
a strong presumption that the ministerial exception precludes federal and 
state statutory and common law whistleblower claims brought by ministers, 
which would bar the vast majority of minister whistleblower claims.217  For 
most whistleblower laws, the underlying governmental interest being 
furthered is not sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on a religious 
institution’s First Amendment right to select its ministers, and there are 
ways other than whistleblower laws that the government can further the 
interests that underly these laws. 218 
The strong presumption that the ministerial exception bars minister 
whistleblower claims219 may be overcome by clear and convincing proof 
that the underlying whistleblower law exists to encourage or mandate the 
whistleblower to report criminal acts involving physical harm to third 
parties, to protect the whistleblower for refusing to commit criminal acts 
that would cause physical harm to third parties, or to encourage or mandate 
the whistleblower to report civil violations involving physical harm to third 
parties.220  Under this standard, minister whistleblower suits based on 
employment termination for reporting child abuse would be permitted.  A 
claim like that in Erdman, where a minister asserted that he or she was fired 
                                                          
 214. See generally supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts 
between accomplishing the goals of whistleblower laws and protecting the ministerial 
decisions of religious organizations). 
 215. See Berg, supra note 13, at 1613.  Berg notes: 
The ministerial exemption should rest fundamentally on the right of a church to 
choose its leaders and those who speak for it . . . .  We keep courts out of such 
questions not just for the sake of doing so, but ultimately for the sake of substantive 
religious autonomy: when judges make theological determinations, they may distort 
and unjustifiably override a church’s organization and self-understanding. 
Id. 
 216. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 170–72. 
 219. See, e.g., Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2010) (warning that First Amendment violations could result if the ministerial 
exception is not applied to whistleblower claims). 
 220. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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merely for reporting an alleged civil violation involving church 
administration, would not be protected.221 
Minister whistleblower claims based on reports of alleged civil violations 
of health and safety laws, financial and accounting practices, tax laws, and 
laws related to governmental administration would be barred under the First 
Amendment.  Once again, the fundamental value is to protect religious 
institutions from governmental interference in ministerial selections so the 
institutions can shape their own faith and accomplish their own mission.  
Rarely should a minister whistleblower claim be permitted.  If permitted, 
the minister should only be able to sue for damages and not reinstatement 
of his or her position. 
D.  Category Four: Tort Claims 
A minister plaintiff can presumably dress up minister employment-based 
tort claims in a variety of ways.  Such claims would be based on law 
imposing some sort of statutory or common-law duty on religious 
organizations with respect to how they make ministerial selection decisions.  
In general, the First Amendment should bar such claims for the same 
reasons that employment discrimination, retaliation claims, and 
whistleblower claims are barred.222  However, minister employment-based 
claims where the minister is claiming the religious organization had a duty 
to protect the minister from physical harm suffered by organizational agents 
in the workplace could perhaps still be permitted without running afoul of 
the First Amendment.223  This type of permitted claim would be consistent 
with suits brought by third-parties against religious organizations alleging 
that such organization had knowledge that their clergy were sexually 
abusing children, but did not take appropriate steps to end such abuse and 
protect third parties.224  The legal responsibilities to protect employees and 
other individuals in the organization from physical harm are no different for 
religious organizations than others.  Imposing such responsibilities on 
religious organizations is consistent with First Amendment principles. 
                                                          
 221. See Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357, 360, 372 (Wash. 
2012). 
 222. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 223. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 960, 964, 969 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the ministerial exception did not bar a hostile work environment sexual 
harassment suit); Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947, 950 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a priest’s sexual harassment claim was not barred by the First 
Amendment). 
 224. See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360–61 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not bar negligent hiring and supervision claims against a church based on 
clergy sexual abuse of a child).
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E.  Category Five: Miscellaneous Claims 
There are a variety of potential minister employment-based claims that 
should resist categorization.  The law should evaluate whether they should 
be permitted under the First Amendment on a case-specific basis utilizing 
the various principles outlined in this Article.225  For example, pension 
claims and wage payment claims would not seem to raise Free Exercise or 
Establishment Clause concerns because the issues litigated in those cases 
would presumably not affect how a religious institution selects its ministers 
and would not influence or impact a religious institution’s religious 
doctrine, faith, or beliefs. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The founding generation was prescient in understanding the importance 
of constitutional protection for religious freedom and expression.  It is self-
evident that a religious institution’s ability to select its leaders free from 
governmental interference is a core First Amendment right.  The founding 
generation could not have foreseen how the modern state would pervasively 
regulate the employment relationship.  Moreover, they could not have 
anticipated how such secular laws could impact religious organizations’ 
decisions involving selection of religious leaders if such laws were allowed 
to apply to ministerial employment decisions.  The pervasiveness of modern 
state regulation of the employment relationship is a given.  The question is 
how to navigate the relationship between church and state at the intersection 
of religious organization missions, employment laws, and ministerial 
selection.  Judicial interpretations of the First Amendment in minister 
employment suits should err on the side of providing as much room as 
possible for religious organizations to select their leaders free from 
governmental interference.  Such breathing room will help religious 
institutions shape their faith and accomplish their mission.  On many 
occasions, the cost of such breathing room is that secular employment laws 
may fall by the way side.  The gain of religious freedom is generally worth 







                                                          
 225. See, e.g., Verlee v. Astrue, No 1:12-CV-45, 2013 WL 1760931, at *8 (N.D. Ind. 
Feb. 4, 2013) (holding that awarding Social Security Administration disability benefits to a 
minister did not interfere with the church’s right to select its ministers); Tubra v. Cooke, 225 
P.3d 862, 872–73 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a pastor’s defamation suit against church 
officials was not barred by the First Amendment). 
